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Foreign ﬁrms often have a more educated workforce and pay higher wages than
domestic ﬁrms. This does not necessarily imply that foreign ownership translates into
higher demand for educated workers or higher wages, since foreign investment may be
guided by unobservable ﬁrm characteristics correlated with the demand for educated
workers or wages. I examine foreign acquisitions of domestic ﬁrms and ﬁnd small
changes in the workforce skill composition and wages following acquisition. Foreign
investors “cherry pick” domestic ﬁrms that are already very similar to the group of
existing foreign ﬁrms.
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Regions and countries compete for foreign investment because it is perceived to have several
beneﬁts for the host economy (Caves, 1996). For example, foreign ﬁrms often are associated
with better technology, which may spill over to domestic ﬁrms1. Moreover, their jobs are
perceived to be good in the sense that they require more qualiﬁcations, oﬀer more training
or pay higher wages. These reasons have been used to justify regional or national industrial
policy in order to secure foreign investment.
Existing empirical work comparing foreign and domestic ﬁrms has shown that foreign
ﬁrms have a more educated workforce and pay higher wages than domestic ﬁrms. But
these ﬁndings may at least in part be driven by selection of foreign investment into certain
ﬁrms or sectors. For example, consider the ﬁnding that foreign ownership is associated
with higher wages. This may be driven by wages increasing after the foreign acquisition,
or by foreigners buying domestic ﬁrms that pay above-average wages. In this paper, I use
panel data on Portuguese ﬁrms to provide evidence on the type of domestic ﬁrms bought
by foreigners and on the eﬀect of foreign acquisitions on skill composition and wages. I
ﬁnd that foreigners “cherry pick” domestic ﬁrms, choosing those ﬁr m sw i t ha ne d u c a t e d
workforce and higher wages. Moreover, these ﬁrms are already very similar to the group
of existing foreign ﬁrms. Following the foreign acquisition, I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant changes in
the educational composition of the workforce. There is evidence that average wages increase
following the foreign acquisition but changes are smaller than cross-sectional estimates of
this diﬀerential.
The positive wage premium for foreign ﬁrms is a stylized fact for developed and develop-
ing countries. Feliciano and Lipsey (1999), using industry-level data for the US for the period
1987-1992, ﬁnd a diﬀerential in favor of foreign ﬁrms that is larger for services (9-10 percent)
than for manufacturing (5-7 percent). For UK manufacturing establishments, Girma et al.
(1999) ﬁnd that foreign ﬁrms pay, on average, about 5 percent higher wages than domestic
ﬁrms, even when sector, establishment size and productivity are controlled for. For Mexico
1For example, Dimelis and Louri (2001), Haskel et al.(2002) and Aitken et al.(1996) ﬁnd evidence consis-
tent with positive spillovers to the host economy.
2and Venezuela, Aitken et al. (1996), also ﬁnd higher wages for foreign ﬁrms. With competi-
tive labor markets, there is no reason for a positive foreign wage premium unless workers or
ﬁrms diﬀer in some unobservable characteristics. In most of the ﬁrm level data sets used in
the empirical literature, worker level information such as education, experience and tenure
of the workforce is not collected. The assumption in this work is that omitting these char-
acteristics does not generate signiﬁcant biases in the estimation of the diﬀerences between
domestic and foreign ﬁrms. Lipsey and Sjoholm (2003) control for the worker’s education
and other worker level characteristics but they still ﬁnd a foreign wage premium in a cross
section of Indonesian ﬁrms. Conyon et al. (2002) and Lipsey and Sjoholm (2002) try to
overcome the problem of the unobservable ﬁrm characteristics that are correlated to the ﬁrm
nationality by analyzing the impact on average wages of a foreign acquisition. Conyon et al.
(2002) ﬁnd that average wages increase by 3.4 percent following a foreign acquisition but they
do not control for any workforce characteristics. Lipsey and Sjoholm (2002) ﬁnd that average
wages of blue and white collar workers increase by 10 percent and 21percent respectively.
Both ﬁnd evidence that part of the cross section wage premium in manufacturing is due to a
causal eﬀect of foreign investment on wages. An alternative explanation for the foreign wage
premium is based on imperfect labor markets. For example, if foreigners incur in higher
search costs they may pay more to workers in order to discourage turnover. If foreign ﬁrms
oﬀer more training, have less power with unions or are more likely to adhere to minimum
wages, they may also pay higher wages. Moreover, foreigners could pay higher wages simply
b e c a u s et h e yh a v eh i g h e rp r o ﬁtability than domestic ﬁrms (rent sharing theories2).
In this paper I analyze the Portuguese case which combines two important features. First,
Portugal had a permissive legal framework for the operation of foreign ﬁrms that translated
into generous amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the late 1980s and 1990s3.
Before becoming an European Union member in 1986, the amount of FDI in Portugal never
2Rent sharing theories argue that the labor market is not competitive as empirically wages are correlated
with measures of the ﬁrm or industry “ability to pay”. See e.g. Blanchﬂower et al. (1996) for evidence on
the US manufacturing.
3The importance of European Union and OECD as sources of FDI is clear: in 1992, 76% of the FDI came
from the EU and 89% from OECD countries.
3reached 1 percent of GDP (3.2 percent of total investment); in the early 1990s it tripled to
3.2 percent (12 percent of total investment in 1990). Second, a comprehensive ﬁrm level data
set covering the 1990s is available. In particular, the ﬁrm and its foreign participation can
be traced over time, making this data particularly suited for the analysis of FDI on labor
demand and wages4.
One of the relevant topics in the policy debate is the impact of FDI on labor markets
and, in particular, on employment and wages of the diﬀerent educational groups. Mata and
Portugal (2002) document that, in Portugal during the 1980s, foreign start-ups and foreign
acquisitions5 had a more educated labor force than domestic start-ups. They also ﬁnd that
foreign start-ups and foreign acquisitions pay, on average, higher wages than domestic start-
ups. However, one of the reasons for this ﬁnding might be the educational level of workers
in the new foreign and domestic ﬁrms6.T h em o s ti m p o r t a n td i ﬀerence between their work
and my paper is that I am interested in identifying the eﬀect of foreign acquisitions on labor
demand and wages. Moreover, I am also interested in identifying how ﬁrms acquired by
foreigners diﬀer from the typical domestic ﬁrm.
Using data for the period 1991-1998, I start by analyzing diﬀerences in workforce educa-
tional composition and wage structure between foreign and domestic ﬁrms, without making
any distinction between foreign acquisitions and existing foreign ﬁrms. A large part of the
diﬀerences are explained by the sector and regional composition of foreign ﬁrms and, to a
lower extent, by other ﬁrm and worker characteristics usually unaccounted for due to lack
of data. But even after controlling for these characteristics, signiﬁcant diﬀerences remain in
wages and workforce characteristics of domestic and foreign ﬁrms. For example, in manu-
facturing, foreign ﬁrms have a proportion of low educated workers 7 percentage points lower
than domestic ﬁrms and pay 15 percent higher wages, even after controlling for regional and
4Abowd et al. (1999) use a matched employer-employee data set for France, very similar to the data used
in this paper. They ﬁnd that ﬁrm eﬀects, while important, are not as important as unobservable individual
eﬀects in explaining wage variation.
5Foreigners may start operating in a country by two diﬀerent ways: greenﬁeld entry (start-ups) or acqui-
sition of an ongoing ﬁrm.
6Machado and Mata (1998) using data for Portugal, between 1982 and 1994, found also that foreign ﬁrms
pay higher wages and that this premium was larger for higher wages.
4sector composition as well as size and age of the ﬁrm.
The data set I use allows me to identify the group of ﬁrms that switch from domestic to
foreign ownership during the 1990s. Therefore, I make two contributions to the literature on
the eﬀects of foreign ﬁrms on the labor market. First, comparing outcomes before and after
foreign acquisitions one can control for ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity since it seems likely
that some of the unobservable characteristics of the ﬁrm do not change over time and can be
captured in a ﬁxed eﬀect. Second, comparing the group of acquired ﬁrms with the typical
domestic ﬁrm in the pre-acquisition period, I can assess the extent to which ﬁrms acquired
by foreigners diﬀer from the typical domestic ﬁrm.
One of my main ﬁndings is that there exists an important selection eﬀect as foreigners
“cherry pick” domestic ﬁrms with a more educated workforce. For example, looking at
manufacturing ﬁrms that were acquired by foreigners between 1993 and 1996, I ﬁnd that,
two years before the acquisition, they have a proportion of low educated workers 9 percentage
points lower than that of domestic ﬁrms in the same sector of activity and pay higher wages
to all education groups (diﬀerentials range from 17 percent for the low educated to 39 percent
to the high educated workers). In fact, domestic ﬁrms that were acquired between 1993 and
1996, already looked very similar to existing foreign ﬁrms in workforce composition and
wage structure. I also ﬁnd that there are no signiﬁcant changes in the ﬁrm’s workforce
composition following a foreign acquisition. Wages increase for most of the education groups
after the acquisition, even though this increase is smaller than in cross-sectional comparisons
of domestic and foreign ﬁrms.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, I describe the data used and
present some descriptive statistics. Section 3 explains the econometric methodology, presents
and discusses the results on workforce composition. Section 4 and discusses the results on
wage structure. Section 5 concludes.
52. Data
The data set used is a survey conducted every year by the Portuguese Ministry of Employ-
ment, “Quadros do Pessoal”. It is a longitudinal data ﬁle matching ﬁrms and workers. The
data is based on a questionnaire that every ﬁrm with wage-earners operating in Portugal
is legally obliged to ﬁll out7. Records are available at the ﬁrm and plant level, and have a
detailed description of the labor force characteristics8.
Among other ﬁrm characteristics, the share of equity owned by non-residents is reported.
Therefore, for every ﬁrm I am able to identify whether the foreign investment is (1) an
acquisition of an existing domestic ﬁrm, (2) a fully owned subsidiary or (3) a minority or
majority holding. I use a 10 percent threshold of foreign participation to classify a ﬁrm
as foreign and also to identify ownership changes9. Evidence in panel 5 of Table A1 in
the Appendix shows that the choice of a 10 percent threshold is not too restrictive. In
manufacturing, more than half of the foreign acquisitions have the full control of the ﬁrm,
while foreign ﬁrms prefer majority stakes. In non-manufacturing, the foreign participation,
in both foreign and acquired ﬁrms, is preferentially one of full control. At the worker level, I
use information on the education level, sex, age, tenure and hours worked. This information
is then aggregated, by education groups, at the ﬁrm level. The three education groups
used are: low (up to 6 years of schooling), medium (high school and technical courses)
and high (bachelor and college degrees). Gross monthly wages are computed summing up
monthly earnings as well as other regular and irregular payments. Hourly wages are gross
wages divided by total monthly hours worked (including overtime). Firm average wages
are computed excluding the extreme values for hourly wages10. Throughout the paper I use
7Public Administration is not included.
8The survey has information for an average of 180,199 ﬁrms and of 2,248,076 employees per year, during
1991-1998.
9Ownership is related to those who make decisions about resources, but the relevant concept for policy
purposes is that of control. Measuring control is diﬃcult and, even if a ﬁrm acquires more than 50% of
the shares of another, it may choose not to exercise its controlling rights. On the other hand, even without
majority an owner may have the eﬀective control (McGuckin, 2001, discusses this issue).
10Workers with implausibly low earnings (hourly wage lower than 50% of the minimum wage) or implau-
sibly high earnings (irregular payments -like dismissal payments- exceeding twice the other monthly wage
components) were excluded from the sample. There were few of these cases.
6hourly real wages per employee to control for diﬀerences between foreign and domestic in the
hours worked11. The consumer price index comes from National Department of Statistics.
The level of aggregation used for region and sector composition was Nuts1-region 12 and
three digits sector classiﬁcation13.
The selection of ﬁrms that were acquired by foreigners is done according to the following
criteria. First, I identiﬁed all the ﬁrms that have operated for two consecutive years with
100 percent domestic capital and that for the next three years have at least 10 percent of
foreign capital. Therefore, while these ﬁrms are newly foreign, they existed before under
domestic ownership. Second, I restrict the analysis to ﬁrms that operated for at least ﬁve
consecutive years. If the analysis is to be based on the change in ownership, it is important
to have information on the ﬁrm two years before the acquisition in order to analyze the ﬁrm’s
choices before the ownership change, while the use of the following two years ensure that the
ﬁrm does not exit immediately after. Even though the sample period for identifying foreign
acquisitions is 1993-1996, it stretches to 1991-1998, due to these requirements. Third, the
sample is restricted to ﬁrms with more than 30 employees in every surveyed year. Fourth,
the ﬁrm must be located in continental Portugal and cannot operate in the primary sector in
any surveyed year 14. The selection of ﬁrms that remain always under domestic and foreign
ownership was as similar as possible to the sample of acquisitions. First, they must operate
for at least ﬁve consecutive years. Second, during that period a domestic ﬁrm can never be
foreign participated and foreign ﬁrms have always at least 10 percent of foreign ownership.
11Workers of foreign owned ﬁrms work on avearge less hours than workers in domestic ﬁrms. E.g., low
educated workers in foreign ﬁrms work 171 hours per month (173 hours in domestic ﬁr m s )a n dh i g he d u c a t e d
workers work 166 hours (168 hours in domestic ﬁrms).
12Eurostat divides the european countries into Nuts (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics).
These can vary between Nut 1 to Nut 3, according to the disagregation level. The Nut 1 classiﬁcation
divides Portugal into 5 regions: North, Center, Lisbon Area, Alentejo and Algarve.
13Because the national sector classiﬁcation changed in 1994, I assumed that, between 1991 and 1995, there
is no change in sector classiﬁcation at three digit level by using the ﬁrm sector classiﬁcation in 1995.
14The usual problem of the non-random exit of acquisitions from the sample (attrition) does not seem to
be severe in this data. Mata and Portugal (2002) ﬁnd evidence that the survival rates for acquired ﬁrms
are very high. After ﬁve years of operation more than two thirds and more than four ﬁfths of the foreign
greenﬁeld and acquisition entrants are still in operation. This is not the case for the UK, where Girma and
Görg (2001) ﬁnd that foreign acquisitions reduce the probability of survival of the plant in the electronics
industry.
7Third, they must have at least 30 employees in every sampled year. Fourth, they must be
located in continental Portugal and cannot operate in the primary sector15.T h eﬁnal sample
is an unbalanced panel of 3,410 domestic ﬁrms, 194 foreign ﬁrms and 103 foreign acquisitions
of domestic ﬁrms16.Ih a v ea l s oi d e n t i ﬁed a group of 37 domestic acquisitions of foreign ﬁrms
(24 in manufacturing and 13 in non-manufacturing17). Due to the small number of these
observations I focus the analysis on the group of foreign acquisitions18.
Table A1 in the Appendix characterizes the ﬁnal sample in several dimensions. Panel 1.6
shows that sector composition of the foreign investment explains part of the wage diﬀerentials
between foreign and domestic ﬁrms. The proportion of ﬁrms located in the top highest
paid sectors are at least two times larger in foreign owned ﬁrms than in domestic ﬁrms.
Therefore, a better measure of the diﬀerences in skill composition and wages between foreign
and domestic ﬁrms must control for the fact that foreign ﬁrms tend to be concentrated in
diﬀerent sectors of activity. Let pk
js be the share of education group k in the total workforce
of foreign ﬁrm j operating in sector s, pk
s be the share of education group k of domestic ﬁrms
operating in sector s, wk
js be the avearge hourly wage of education group k in foreign ﬁrm j
and wk
s the average hourly wage of education group k in domestic ﬁrms operating in sector





s.T h ed i ﬀerences in employment are reported as the average across sectors of the
empjs
emps , where empjs is the employment of the foreign ﬁrm j operating in sector s and emps
is the average employment in the domestic ﬁrms of the sector. I compute the diﬀerences
between ﬁrms operating in the same two-digit sector of activity. Panel A reports the results
for manufacturing sectors and panel B for non-manufacturing sectors.
Column (1) compares foreign and domestic ﬁrms. In manufacturing, the share of low ed-
15The primary sector includes agriculture and mining. Firms operating in 3 digit sectors with exclusively
domestic ﬁrms that ﬁll in these requirements were excluded from the sample.
1673% of the domestic ﬁrms in the sample and 58% of the foreign and acquired ﬁrms operate in manu-
facturing sectors. More than 90% of the ﬁrms in the sample are observed for more than six years. 1% of
domestic ﬁrms are observed for less than ﬁve years because they have less than 30 workers in the worker’s
ﬁles during that year.
17There are only two ﬁrms that ﬁll these requirements and that experienced more than one ownership
change, i.e., a foreign and a domestic acquisition).
18However, at the end of each section I discuss the ﬁndings when this sample is also included.
8ucated workers is 9 percentage points lower than that of domestic ﬁrms, while the groups of
medium and high educated workers have shares 7 percentage points and 3 percentage points,
respectively, higher than those of domestic ﬁrms. In non-manufacturing, these diﬀerences
are even greater with the share of low educated workers 25 percentage points below, and of
medium and high educated workers 13 percentage points and 12 percentage points above
that of domestic ﬁrms, respectively19. This evidence shows that foreign ﬁrms have a more ed-
ucated workforce, both in manufacturing and non-manufacturing, and that these diﬀerences
are quantitatively important. Also, foreign ﬁrms employ on average, 3.5 times and 2.2 times
more employees than domestic ﬁrms in manufacturing and non-manufacturing, respectively.
Given the diﬀerences in the educational composition, it is not surprising to ﬁnd diﬀerences
in the average wages among domestic and foreign ﬁrms. In manufacturing foreign ﬁrms pay
wages 26 percent higher than domestic ﬁrms and in non-manufacturing 55 percent higher.
Wage diﬀerences within education categories are also substantial. Also, the foreign wage
premium increases with education. This ﬁnding is important, since it shows that the wage
diﬀerential cannot be entirely explained by diﬀerences in the educational workforce compo-
sition nor by sector composition of foreign ﬁrms, even though region and sector location are
important in explaining the wage diﬀerentials20.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 1 compare acquired ﬁrms with domestic ﬁrms two years
before and one year after the foreign acquisition, respectively. For example, ﬁrms in manu-
facturing two years before becoming foreign owned have, on average, a share of low educated
workers 8 percentage points below that of domestic ﬁrms in the same sector. This diﬀer-
ence increases to 10 percentage points one year after the acquisition. Diﬀerences in non-
manufacturing are even larger with the share of low educated workers 21 percentage points
below that of domestic ﬁrms in the same sector. The magnitude of the wage diﬀerences is
also large and quantitatively very similar to the ones in column (1). This shows that acquired
domestic ﬁrms were already very diﬀerent from the average domestic ﬁrm in the same sector
19Table A2 in the Appendix shows that manufacturing has a less educated workforce and pays, on average,
lower wages than non-manufacturing. These wage diﬀerences prevail within education groups.
20These are unweighted means.
9of activity before the acquisition both in manufacturing and non-manufacturing. Therefore,
acquired ﬁrms have a more educated workforce and pay higher wages than domestic ﬁrms to
all the education groups21. The comparison of columns (2) and (3), shows the evolution fol-
lowing the foreign acquisition. Diﬀerences in the workforce educational composition increase
both in manufacturing and in non-manufacturing. Also, acquired ﬁrms in manufacturing
do not experience any change relative to the average wages of domestic ﬁrms, while in the
non-manufacturing sector there is an increase in wages after the acquisition. Columns (4)
and (5) present the comparisons between acquired and foreign ﬁr m st w oy e a r sb e f o r ea n d
one year after the foreign acquisition, respectively. Diﬀerences both in workforce composi-
tion and wages become much smaller and not statistically signiﬁcant in manufacturing and
non-manufacturing sectors22. Relative to foreign ﬁrms, acquired domestic ﬁrms are similar
in size in manufacturing and are 50 percent larger in non-manufacturing.
Caves (1996) argues that foreign ﬁrms have a technological advantage over domestic
ﬁrms, either generated by the ownership of some intangible assets (e.g. speciﬁc technological
knowledge, a brand name or superior organizational capabilities) or by a privileged access to
external capital markets. If this is the case, we would expect this advantage of foreign over
domestic ﬁrms to translate into a higher demand for skilled workers on the one hand, and
into higher productivity, and therefore higher wages on the other. Descriptive statistics in
this section show that foreign ﬁrms have a more educated workforce and pay higher average
wages. The wage premium is in part explained by the higher human capital of foreign
ﬁrms but that is not all, as diﬀerences are still prevalent within each education category.
Furthermore, ﬁrms that will become acquired in the following two years already have a more
educated workforce and pay higher wages than domestic ﬁrms in the same sector of activity.
During this period, they already look very similar to foreign ﬁrms. But, as seen in Table
A1, foreign ﬁrms tend to be located in the Lisbon area where average wage are higher, and
21The hypothesis that acquired ﬁrms have lower shares of low educated workers and higher shares of
medium and high educated workers cannot be rejected in columns (1) to (3). The hypothesis of a positive
wage diﬀerential for all the education groups is also not rejected.
22The hypothesis that acquired ﬁrms do not diﬀer from foreign ﬁrms in the workforce composition and
wages paid is not rejected in columns (4) and (5).
10tend to be larger than domestic ﬁrms. Worker characteristics may also diﬀer between foreign
and domestic ﬁrms causing average wages to diﬀer. I turn next to regression analysis where
these and other ﬁrm and worker characteristics will be taken into account.
3. Employment in Foreign Firms
To analyze employment of skilled labor, I estimate the following model for the three education
groups (low, medium and high):
ykjt = βkforjt + Zjtλk + αkt + αkr + αks +  kjt (3.1)
ykjt is ﬁrm j share of workers with education k at time t. forjt is a dummy variable if ﬁrm
is foreign owned, therefore, at this stage I do not take into account if a domestic ﬁrm will
become foreign owned latter on. Zjt is a vector of ﬁrm characteristics including both a set
of dummy variables for the size of ﬁrm j at time t ( less than 49 workers, 50-99, 100-499,
more than 500) and a set of dummy variables for the ﬁrm age (less than 5 years, 5-15, more
than 15). Finally, αkt, αkr and αks are time, region and sector dummy variables, respec-
tively. The year dummies control for economy wide shocks that aﬀect one education group
similarly across all ﬁrms. Diﬀerences due to regional location of the ﬁrms are captured by
αkr and diﬀerences due to sector composition are captured by αks. Because the impact of
the explanatory variables on the three education groups has to sum up to zero, these re-
strictions are imposed in the model23 (e.g. βlow + βmed + βhig =0 ) . I estimate the three
equations jointly as a system of seemingly unrelated equations. Table 2 presents the results
for manufacturing24. Reported standard errors assume that disturbances are independently
distributed across ﬁrms. Speciﬁcation (1) reports the results of including only the variable
forjt in the model. Foreign ﬁrms have a less educated workforce (proportion of low edu-
cated workers 15 percentage points lower than in domestic ﬁrms). Including explanatory
variables as sector, region, size and cohort decreases the coeﬃcients of low and medium ed-
23This procedure is standard in the literature estimating demand equations since the shares of expenditure
in diﬀerent goods must sum up to one.
24Throughout the paper I report the results separately for manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.
I never accept that the models are the same for the two groups.
11ucated workers in almost 50 percent: the share of medium and high educated workers are
5 percentage points and 2 percentage points above that in domestic ﬁrms, respectively25.
Table 3 reports the same results for non-manufacturing. Again, part of the diﬀerences in the
workforce composition between domestic and foreign ﬁrms are due to region, sector, size of
the foreign ﬁrms. However, as reported in column (2) of these tables, even after controlling
f o rt h e s ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,t h ep r o p o r t i o no fm e d i u me d u c a t e da n dh i g he d u c a t e dw o r k e r si s6
percentage points and 9 percentage points above that in domestic ﬁrms.
These cross-sectional ﬁndings may at least in part be driven by selection of foreign invest-
ment into certain ﬁrms or sectors with a more skilled workforce. Table A3 in the Appendix
shows that at the time of the acquisition, foreigners may choose among domestic ﬁrms
operating in the same two-digit sector with very diﬀerent workforce compositions26.B ye s t i -
mating the same model within two-digit sectors of activity I rule out the second hypothesis
of sector selection. Table A4 in the Appendix shows that foreign ﬁrms have a more educated
workforce within almost all two-digit sectors27.
3.1. The Sample of Foreign Acquisitions
One way to control for the unobservable characteristics that might explain the diﬀerences
between foreign and domestic ﬁrms is by comparing the period before and after the acquisi-
tion for those ﬁrms that are acquired by foreigners. This sample, by construction, controls
for part of the unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity since it is the same ﬁrm changing ownership,
and several things remain constant before and after the acquisition. For example, with in-
formation on acquisitions it is possible to know whether foreigners increase the demand for
education or if they buy ﬁrms with the closest structure possible to theirs. To disentangle
these eﬀects, the following model is estimated for the sample of acquisitions and foreign
25To allow for diﬀerentiated impacts on the labor market outcomes according to the percentage of foreign
capital, I estimate the same model with minority, majority and full foreign ownership dummies. Foreign ﬁrms
have a more educated workforce for all groups and results are not statistically diﬀerent between majority
and full ownership.
26Table A3 in the Apendix computes the means and standard deviations for the proportions of high
educated workers within each sector of activity for the domestic ﬁrms in the sample. The heterogeneity in
the workforce composition also holds within a regions and sectors of activity.
27Sectors where the diﬀerences between foreign and domestic ﬁrms are highest include the wholesale and
retail trade, transport and communication as wella sr e a le s t a t e( a l ln o n - m anufacturing sectors).
12owned ﬁrms:
ykjt = ηkj + βforkjt + Zkjtλk + αkt + αkr + αks +  kjt (3.2)
where forjt is a dummy variable if ﬁrm j is foreign owned. The ﬁxed eﬀect, ηkj, summarizes
the impact of permanent diﬀerences in observed and unobserved characteristics aﬀecting the
outcome ykjt. The remaining variables have the same notation as above28. Finally, the error
term,  kjt, is assumed to be uncorrelated across ﬁrms and time. The parameters in equation
(3.2) are estimated, including the ﬁxed eﬀects, by least squares. Thus, no matter how the
ﬁrm’s permanent characteristics are related to the acquisition, the estimates of this eﬀect
are unbiased.
This estimation approach generalizes the diﬀerences in diﬀerences technique. The need for
including another group of ﬁrms in the regression is made clear in Meyer (1994). Comparing
an outcome before and after the acquisition is not suﬃcient because it could also be aﬀected
by other factors that are contemporaneous with the acquisition. Assuming that shocks
contemporaneous to the acquisition aﬀect acquired ﬁrms and control ﬁrms in the same way,
the coeﬃcient on the foreign ownership variable would be an unbiased estimator of the impact
of ownership change. The main problem of applying this research design in this sample is that
it is not appropriate when the two groups being compared are very diﬀerent already during
the pre-acquisition period. As suggested by the ﬁndings in table 1, acquired and foreign ﬁrms
are very similar with respect to their workforce composition. Therefore, to analyze changes
in labor market outcomes following the foreign acquisition, I start by comparing acquired
ﬁrms with other foreign-owned ﬁrms, as these are a better counterfactual than domestic
ﬁrms. The important issue is to establish what would have happened to the ﬁrm had it not
been acquired by foreigners. By using this group it is less likely that estimates are biased
due to the selection.
Column (3) in tables 2 and 3 present the results of estimating equation (3.2) using
foreign ﬁrms as control group. Following the acquisition, there are no signiﬁcant changes
28Region and sector dummies are identiﬁed because there are switchers in these categories. However,
empirical ﬁndings do not depend upon their inclusion.
13in the educational composition of the workforce in acquired domestic ﬁrms29.T h e o n l y
signiﬁcant change is for the group of low educated workers in manufacturing, whose share
falls by 1 percentage point following the acquisition. Table A5 in the Appendix shows
that there is no evidence of signiﬁcant changes following the acquisition in the size of the
ﬁrms in manufacturing. Therefore, this decrease in the share of low educated workers is
reﬂecting a decrease in the number of low educated workers. In non-manufacturing the
number of employees increases by 25 percent and 27 percent, by the second and third year
following the acquisition and, therefore, the number of low educated workers must increase
accordingly30. To check the robustness of the results relative to the ﬁrms included in the
control group, I estimate the same model including all the domestic and foreign ﬁrms in the
sample. The results are presented in column (4) of table 231. In sum, if foreigners choose to
enter a market by acquiring an existent domestic ﬁrm, they may look for a ﬁrm where they
need to make adjustments in the workforce composition or they may target a ﬁrm whose
workforce composition is close to the desired level. My ﬁndings show that foreigners choose
this second option since there is no signiﬁcant adjustment in workforce composition following
the acquisition. This seems a reasonable strategy in the presence of important employment
protection in the Portuguese labor market (see Blanchard and Portugal, 2001).
4. Wages in Foreign Firms
To analyze the diﬀerences in the wage structure for the three education groups, I estimate
hourly wages per employee as a function of several ﬁrm and worker characteristics, including
29Although not reported, these results are robust to the inclusion of the domestic acquisitions of foreign
ﬁrms in the sample.
30Speciﬁcation (3.2) is restrictive as it estimates an average eﬀect following the acquisition, and restricts
the impact to be zero in the years before the acquisition. I allowed for a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation where
the acquisition can aﬀect the workforce composition up to four years before and after the acquisition year
(see Jacobson et al., 1993, for a similar methodology). For manufacturing I ﬁnd that, 3 years before the
acquisition the proportion of low educated workers starts decresing and the proportions of medium and
high increasing. Specially in the third year following the acquisition there is evidence of quantitatively
important changes. In non-manufacturing, the share of low educated workers also has a negative trend that
is accompanied by an increase in the share of the medium educated. These changes start three years before
the acquisition and, again, are not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
31For computational reasons the coeﬃcients in this model were not restricted.
14a foreign ownership variable:
wkjt = βkforjt + Zjtλk + Xkjtγk + αkt + αkr + αks +  kjt (4.1)
w stands for logarithm of real hourly wages per employee of education group k of ﬁrm j
at time t. Xjtk is a vector of worker level characteristics within each education group k
including the average age of the workers in the group, the average potential experience of
the workers32,t h ea v e r a g et e n u r eo nt h eﬁrm and the proportion of females in the group.
Squared terms for the age, experience and tenure variables were also included. The vector Zjt
of ﬁrm characteristics includes size and age of the ﬁrm. The rationale for including the size of
the ﬁrm on the wage equation is that foreign ﬁrms are, on average, larger, and some theories
argue that larger ﬁrms pay more, either because eﬃciency wage theory is more eﬀective
when there is higher probability of long term relations, or because it is a compensating
diﬀerential (a more dependable production process increases the cost of shirking). Finally,
αkt controls for economy wide shocks that aﬀect one education group similarly across all
ﬁrms. Diﬀerences due to regional location are captured by αkr and diﬀerences due to sector
composition are captured by αks.
Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (4.1) by weighted least squares to
control for heteroskedasticity since the data is aggregated by education groups within the
ﬁrm. Without controlling for diﬀerences in other characteristics, foreign ﬁrms pay 28% higher
wages for the low educated, 19% for the medium educated and 47% for the high educated
in manufacturing. Controlling for sector, region, size and age of the ﬁrm (column (2))
accounts for almost 50 percent of these diﬀerences. However, the diﬀerences between foreign
and domestic ﬁrms remain quantitatively important and statistically signiﬁcant for all the
education groups. Adding worker characteristics in column (3) does not imply substantial
changes33. The foreign wage premium is higher for those workers with more than six years of
32Computed as age - years of schooling - six.
33I ﬁnd that for manufacturing sectors, larger and younger ﬁrms pay higher wages. Wages also increase
w i t ht h ea v e r a g ea g eo ft h ew o r k f o r c ea n dt h en u m b e ro fy e a r so fe x p e r i e n c ei nt h eﬁrm. Firm size, measured
by total employment, is important for explaining wage diﬀerences in manufacturing (Feliciano and Lipsey,
1999). Large ﬁrms pay higher wages and because foreign ﬁrms are more than three times larger than domestic
ﬁr m s ,t h ew a g ed i ﬀerential would have been 20 percent higher, not accounting for this characteristic.
15schooling. The ﬁndings for non-manufacturing in table 5 are somewhat similar. In column (1)
foreigners pay wages 14% higher for low educated, 41% higher for the medium educated and
33% higher for the high educated. Controlling for ﬁrm characteristics implies a substantial
decrease in the coeﬃcients. Diﬀerences across ﬁrms in the characteristics of the medium
educated account for part of the wage diﬀerence. However, after controlling for ﬁrm and
worker characteristics I still ﬁnd a wage diﬀerential of 8% for the low educated, 16% for
the medium educated and of 11% for the high educated34. In sum, the results suggest
that controlling for observable ﬁrm and worker characteristics explains part of the wage
diﬀerential but fails to explain fully the foreign wage premium. At least part of these
diﬀerences can reﬂect diﬀerences in the wage premiums of foreign ﬁr m sa c r o s ss e c t o r so f
activity. Evidence in Table A6 in the Appendix shows that even within 2-digit sector of
activity the cross-section diﬀerences between foreign and domestic ﬁrms remain statistically
signiﬁcant in several sectors.
4.1. The Sample of Foreign Acquisitions
In this subsection I use the sample of foreign acquisitions to control for those ﬁrm unobserv-
able characteristics correlated with higher wages and also with the foreign ownership. The
model estimated is the following:
wkjt = ηkj + βkforjt + Zjtλk + Xkjtγk + αkt + αkr + αks +  kjt (4.2)
w h e r ea l lt h en o t a t i o ni sa sa b o v e .
The results of estimating equation (4.2), including the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, by weighted
least squares are presented in columns (4) and (5) of table 4 for manufacturing and in table
5 for non-manufacturing. In manufacturing, low, medium and high educated workers have
increases in wages following the acquisition of 3%, 5% and 13%, respectively. These values
are substantially smaller than the ones reported in the cross section. Therefore, part of the
34For non-manufacturing, wages are higher in ﬁrms with more than 100 workers and where the workforce
has more experience in the ﬁrm. Contrary to manufacturing, worker characteristics like age and tenure on
the ﬁrm are important in explaining wage diﬀerences. Controlling for the age of the ﬁrm has a small eﬀect
o nt h ew a g ed i ﬀerentials of non-manufacturing (3 percent increase) and no eﬀect in manufacturing.
16cross section diﬀerences that we observe in the data are correlated with ﬁrm unobserved
characteristics and, therefore, cannot be attributed to the foreign ownership itself. To test
the robustness of the results, in column (5) I include all the domestic and foreign ﬁrms in
the control group. I still ﬁnd that wage increases following the acquisition are substantially
smaller than the cross sectional estimates. The ﬁndings for non-manufacturing are reported
in table 5. Wages for the low educated increase by 5% following the acquisition while the
wages for the other groups remain unchanged. Including the domestic ﬁrms in the control
group leads to an increase in wages of the medium educated by 4% while the wages of the
high educated decrease in 4%.
The observed increase in average wages within education groups following an acquisition
could be the result of a decrease in the number of low productivity workers in the ﬁrm or
it could be the result of an increase in the average productivity per worker. The ﬁndings in
the previous section show that there is no substantial change in the educational composition
of the workforce following a foreign acquisition. Assuming that ﬁrms are not replacing low
ability workers by high ability workers within educational groups, my ﬁndings are more
supportive of the argument that average productivity increases following an acquisition.
To test whether increases in wages are driven by increases in productivity I include as
explanatory variable a proxy for the ﬁrm aggregate productivity. The best available measure
in my data to measure productivity is the average sales per employee. This measure is likely
to be plagged by measurement error, since it does not include intermediate goods. My
assumption is that the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect atenuates this problem. The empirical results show
that, although ﬁrms acquired by foreigners have increases in average sales per employee,
the increase is uncorrelated with the foreign ownership in the wage equation35.I n t h e
presence of imperfect labor markets, foreigners might pay higher wages to workers with
similar characteristics for several reasons. For example, if foreigners incur higher search
costs they may pay more to workers in order to discourage turnover. If foreign ﬁrms oﬀer
more training, have less power with unions or are more likely to adhere to minimum wages,
35Results available upon request. The magnitude of the diﬀerence between foreign and domestic ﬁrms
remains identical to the one reported in columns (4) and (5) of tables 4 and 5.
17they may also pay higher wages.
Finally, I tested for the possibility that the increases in wages are the result of the
acquisition itself rather than a result of the foreign acquisition by including in the sample
the group of domestic acquisitions of foreign ﬁrms. If all the ﬁrms that are acquired have
improvements in productivity and, therefore, higher wages, we would expect that including
this group of ﬁrms would reduce the increases in wages following the foreign ownership. I ﬁnd
that, after including these ﬁrms in the analysis, the wage diﬀerentials associated with foreign
ownership are very similar to those reported in tables 4 and 5. Therefore, the results suggest
that wage increases are not driven by acquisitions but by the foreign ownership itself36.
5. Conclusion
Cross sectional evidence shows that foreign ﬁrms have a more educated workforce and pay
higher wages than domestic ﬁrms. These results do not necessarily imply that foreign direct
investment translates into higher demand for educated workers or higher wages, however,
since foreign investment may be guided by unobservable ﬁrm characteristics correlated with
the demand for educated workers or wages. Using unique ﬁrm-level data for Portugal, I seek
to isolate the eﬀect of foreign direct investment on the demand for educated workers and
wages by observing labor demand and wages of diﬀerent education groups before and after
the foreign acquisition. Existing empirical evidence for European countries is scarce and,
apart from evidence for the United Kingdom, not much is known about the impact of foreign
acquisitions on labor markets. Portugal is an interesting case, as in the late 1980s and 1990s
there was a permissive legal framework for the operation of foreign ﬁrms that translated into
generous amounts of FDI.
My three main ﬁndings are the following. First, I show that foreign ﬁrms have a more
educated workforce and pay higher wages for all education groups even after accounting for
sector and regional composition, as well as other ﬁrm and worker level characteristics usually
36Unfortunatly, with this data I cannot identify the group of acquisitions of domestic ﬁrms made by
national investors. If acquisitions lead to increases in wages, my estimates for the eﬀect of foreign ownership
on wages are over estimated.
18not accounted for due to lack of data. Second, I ﬁnd evidence of an important selection eﬀect
as foreigners “cherry pick” domestic ﬁrms. Moreover, these ﬁrms are already very similar
to the group of existing foreign ﬁrms and, following the foreign acquisition, there are no
signiﬁcant changes in the workforce educational composition. My third ﬁnding, related to
the ﬁrst and second, is that heterogeneity at the ﬁrm level is very important for explaining
diﬀerences in the labor market outcomes between foreign and domestic ﬁrms. In fact, there
are no signiﬁcant changes in the workforce composition following a foreign acquisition and,
while wages increase for most of the education groups, these changes are smaller than the
cross-sectional estimates.
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21Foreign vs 
Domestic
Before After Before After
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Low Educated Workers -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
% Medium Educated Workers 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.02
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
% High Educated Workers 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04)
Employment 3.54 1.97 2.04 0.96 1.02
(0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.14) (0.14)
Av. Wage 0.30 0.26 0.26 -0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Wage Low Educated Workers 0.24 0.18 0.18 -0.04 -0.01
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Wage Medium Educated Workers 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.03 0.05
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Wage High Educated Workers 0.46 0.43 0.50 -0.04 0.11
(0.01) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Foreign vs 
Domestic
Before After Before After
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Low Educated Workers -0.25 -0.21 -0.24 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
% Medium Educated Workers 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.03 0.04
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
% High Educated Workers 0.12 0.05 0.07 -0.04 -0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Employment 2.27 1.89 1.82 1.44 1.49
(0.15) (0.62) (0.44) (0.74) (0.77)
Av. Wage 0.55 0.41 0.45 -0.09 -0.09
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Wage Low Educated Workers 0.39 0.33 0.39 -0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Wage Medium Educated Workers 0.47 0.33 0.34 -0.10 -0.10
(0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Wage High Educated Workers 0.48 0.49 0.42 0.04 -0.04
(0.02) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
Source: "Quadros de Pessoal"
Table 1:
Average differences in workforce composition, employment and 
wages between acquired, domestic and foreign firms
A. Manufacturing
Notes: Wage refers to log of real hourly wage per employee.  Standard Errors in parenthesis. All the statistics are computed relatively to the 
two-digit sector means. "Low educated" includes workers with up to 6 years of schooling, "Medium Educated" includes workers with high 
school and technical courses and " High Educated" includes workers with bachelor and college degrees. "Before" and "After" refer to two 
years before and one year after the acquisition year, respectively. Wage statistics are not weighted.  In columns (1), (2) and (3) the hypothesis 
of a negative differential for the share of low educated workers and a positive differential for the other two groups, relatively to domestic 
firms cannot be rejected. It is also not rejected the test of a positive wage differential for all the education groups. In columns (4) and (5) the 




Acquisitions vs Domestic Acquisitions vs Foreign
Acquisitions vs Foreign(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign Ownership -0.151 -0.075 -0.011 -0.027
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.007] [0.007]***
Adj-R square 0.04 0.25 0.68 0.69
Observations 21,249     21,249   1,345     21,249   
Foreign Ownership 0.115 0.054 0.005 0.016
[0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.006] [0.006]***
Adj-R square 0.04 0.33 0.76 0.79
Observations 21,249     21,249   1,345     21,249   
Foreign Ownership 0.037 0.021 0.007 0.01
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.004] [0.004]***
Adj-R square 0.02 0.14 0.52 0.53
Observations 21,249     21,249   1,345     21,249   
Sector, Region and Time  N Y Y Y
Cohort and Size Firm  N Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects  N N Y Y
Control Group - - F F&D
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable: the proportion of each education group in total workforce. "Low educated" includes 
workers with up to 6 years of schooling, "Medium Educated" includes workers with high school and 
technical courses and " High Educated" includes workers with bachelor and college degrees. 
Specifications (3) and (4) include firm fixed effects. In specification (3) the control group includes only 
foreign owned firms and in specification (4) it includes domestic and foreign firms. I restricted the effect 
of the foreign ownership to sum up to zero for the 3 equations (low, medium and high).
Differences in Workforce Composition Between Foreign and Domestic Firms 
Manufacturing
Table 2:  
Panel A. Low Educated Workers
Panel B. Medium Educated Workers
Panel C. High Educated Workers(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign Ownership -0.334 -0.224 -0.008 0.001
[0.009]*** [0.008]*** [0.008] [0.009]
Adj-R square 0.14 0.42 0.89 0.89
Observations 8,344     8,344     967 8,344       
Foreign Ownership 0.197 0.114 0.012 -0.011
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.009] [0.009]
Adj-R square 0.08 0.35 0.87 0.86
Observations 8,344     8,344     967 8,344       
Foreign Ownership 0.137 0.111 -0.004 0.011
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.008] [0.005]**
Adj-R square 0.14 0.32 0.85 0.86
Observations 8,344     8,344     967 8,344       
Sector, Region and Time  N Y Y Y
Cohort and Size Firm  N Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects  N N Y Y
Control Group - - F F&D
Table 3:  
Panel A. Low Educated Workers
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable: the proportion of each education group in total workforce. "Low educated" includes 
workers with up to 6 years of schooling, "Medium Educated" includes workers with high school and 
technical courses and " High Educated" includes workers with bachelor and college degrees. 
Specifications (3) and (4) include firm fixed effects. In specification (3) the control group includes only 
foreign owned firms and in specification (4) it includes domestic and foreign firms. I restricted the effect 
of the foreign ownership to sum up to zero for the 3 equations (low, medium and high).
Panel B. Medium Educated Workers
Panel C. High Educated Workers
Differences in Workforce Composition Between Foreign and Domestic Firms 
Non-Manufacturing(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign Ownership 0.28 0.12 0.14 0.03 0.04
[0.04]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]* [0.01]***
Adj-R square 0.09 0.56 0.61 0.89 0.83
Observations 21,099   21,099   20,969     1,314     20,969    
Foreign Ownership 0.19 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.08
[0.07]*** [0.03]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.01]***
Adj-R square 0.05 0.46 0.58 0.93 0.86
Observations 19,919   19,919   19,748     1,306     19,748    
Foreign Ownership 0.47 0.2 0.2 0.13 0.08
[0.05]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
Adj-R square 0.16 0.48 0.56 0.81 0.86
Observations 12,292   12,292   12,075     1,076     12,075    
Sector, Region and Time  N Y Y Y Y
Cohort and Size Firm  N Y Y Y Y
Worker Characteristics N N Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects  N N N Y Y
Control Group - - - F F&D
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable: log 
of hourly wages per employee in each educational group. "Low educated" includes workers with up to 6 years of schooling, 
"Medium Educated" includes workers with high school and technical courses and " High Educated" includes workers with 
bachelor and college degrees. Specifications (3) and (4) include firm fixed effects. In specification (3) the control group 
includes only foreign owned firms and in specification (4) it includes domestic and foreign firms.  Worker characteristics 
includes average age of the group, average age squared, average tenure of the group, average tenure squared, average 
experience of the group, average  experience squared and proportion of females in the group. 
Table 4:  
Panel A. Low Educated Workers
Panel B. Medium Educated Workers
Panel C. High Educated Workers
Manufacturing
 Wage Differentials Between  Foreign and Domestic Firms(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign Ownership 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.06
[0.09] [0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.02]** [0.02]***
Adj-R square 0.03 0.49 0.55 0.94 0.82
Observations 8,249     8,249     8,187     901        8,187   
Foreign Ownership 0.41 0.23 0.16 -0.01 0.04
[0.10]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.02] [0.01]***
Adj-R square 0.18 0.66 0.72 0.93 0.91
Observations 8,187     8,187     8,127     944        8,127   
Foreign Ownership 0.33 0.12 0.11 0 -0.04
[0.06]*** [0.06]** [0.05]** [0.03] [0.02]**
Adj-R square 0.13 0.44 0.53 0.84 0.85
Observations 5,602     5,602     5,516     912        5,516   
S e c t o r ,  R e g i o n  a n d  T i m e   NYYYY
C o h o r t  a n d  S i z e  F i r m   NYYYY
W o r k e r  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s NNYYY
F i r m  F i x e d  E f f e c t s   NNNYY
C o n t r o l  G r o u p ---F F & D
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable: 
log of hourly wages per employee in each educational group. "Low educated" includes workers with up to 6 years of 
schooling, "Medium Educated" includes workers with high school and technical courses and " High Educated" includes 
workers with bachelor and college degrees. Specifications (3) and (4) include firm fixed effects. In specification (3) the 
control group includes only foreign owned firms and in specification (4) it includes domestic and foreign firms. Worker 
characteristics includes average age of the group, average age squared, average tenure of the group, average tenure 
squared, average experience of the group, average  experience squared and proportion of females in the group. 
Table 5:  
Panel A. Low Educated Workers
Panel B. Medium Educated Workers
Panel C. High Educated Workers
Non-Manufacturing
 Wage Differentials Between  Foreign and Domestic FirmsDomestic Foreign Acquisitions
firms firms
North 46% 20% 29%
Center 20% 9% 10%
Lisbon Area 31% 66% 59%
Alentejo 2% 1% 2%
Algarve 2% 4% 0%
1.2 Sector 
D. Manufacturing 63% 55% 52%
 DA. Food products, beverages and tabacco 7% 6% 8%
 DB. Textiles and textile products  20% 11% 16%
 DC. Leather and leather products 5% 2% 4%
 DD. Wood and wood products 3% 2% 2%
 DE. Pulp, paper and paper products 3% 2% 3%
 DG. Chemicals and chemical products  1% 9% 4%
 DH. Rubber and plastic products 2% 1% 3%
 DI. Other non-metallic mineral products 6% 4% 3%
 DJ. Basic metals and fabricated metal products 6% 4% 4%
 DK. Machinary and equipment n.e.c. 4% 5% 2%
 DL. Electrical and optical equipment 1% 7% 3%
 DM. Transport equipment 2% 3% 4%
 DN. Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c 3% 2% 2%
E. Electricity, gas and water supply 0% 1% 0%
F. Construction 10% 3% 3%
G. Wholesale and retail trade 16% 22% 22%
Repair motor vehicles and personal goods
H. Hotels and restaurants 4% 6% 3%
I. Transport, storage and communication 4% 4% 6%
J. Finantial Intermediation 1% 4% 5%
K. Real estate, renting and business activities 3% 7% 8%
30-49 27% 7% 2%
50-99 41% 23% 22%
100-499 29% 52% 66%
>500 3% 18% 10%
30-49 31% 13% 16%
50-99 40% 25% 23%
100-499 25% 55% 54%
>500 3% 8% 7%
Source: "Quadros de Pessoal"
Table A1: Characterization of the Panel by ownership type
1.1 Region 
Notes: Statistics are computed in year 1995. Size of the firm is the average number of employees in 1995.
1.3 Size
A. Manufacturing
B. Non-manufacturingDomestic Foreign Acquisitions
firms firms
<5 2% 2% 8%
5-15 33% 29% 34%
>15 65% 69% 58%
<5 3% 3% 7%
5-15 23% 35% 33%
>15 74% 63% 60%
1.5 Percentage foreign capital
10%-50% - 12% 15%
50%-99% - 50% 25%
100% - 37% 60%
10%-50% - 2% 18%
50%-99% - 43% 22%
100% - 55% 59%
Low educated 8% 24% 12%
High educated 8% 23% 15%
Low educated 6% 15% 19%
High educated 4% 8% 11%
Source: "Quadros de Pessoal"
1.6 Firms in the Top 5 highest paid sectors
B. Non-manufacturing
A. Manufacturing
Notes: Statistics are computed in year 1995. The percentage of foreign capital is the average foreign ownership 
during the year. The highest paid sectors for low educated workers are chemicals, electricity, paper products,  
electrical equipment and machinery. The highest paid sectors for high educated workers are chemicals, electrical 
equipment, basic metals and transport eq. The highest paid sectors for low and high educated workers are real 
estate, finantial intermediation and transports. 
Table A1 - Characterization of the Panel (Continued)





% Low Educated Workers 0.81 0.62
(0.17) (0.25)
% Medium Educated Workers 0.14 0.31
(0.12) (0.20)




Av. Wage 1.39 1.64
(0.31) (0.45)
Wage Low Educated Workers 1.33 1.55
(0.28) (0.45)
Wage Medium Educated Workers 1.59 1.70
(0.37) (0.42)
Wage High Educated Workers 2.15 2.21
(0.50) (0.53)
Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis. "Low educated" includes workers with up to 6 years of schooling, 
"Medium Educated" includes workers with high school and technical courses and " High Educated" includes 
workers with bachelor and college degrees. Wage refers to log of real hourly wage per employee.  0.81 in the 
first column means that the average share of low educated workers in manufacturing is 81%. 
and Wages for Domestic Firms
 Table A2: Sample Means of Employment, Workforce Composition Coeff. Var.
High Educated
D. Manufacturing
 DA. Food products, beverages and tabacco 0.03 169
 DB. Textiles and textile products  0.01 309
 DC. Leather and leather products 0.01 238
 DD. Wood and wood products 0.02 187
 DE. Pulp, paper and paper products 0.05 183
 DG. Chemicals and chemical products  0.09 88
 DH. Rubber and plastic products 0.04 152
 DI. Other non-metallic mineral products 0.02 184
 DJ. Basic metals and fabricated metal products 0.03 190
 DK. Machinary and equipment n.e.c. 0.04 120
 DL. Electrical and optical equipment 0.05 82
 DM. Transport equipment 0.03 90
 DN. Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c 0.02 256
F. Construction 0.04 138
G. Wholesale and retail trade 0.04 153
Repair motor vehicles and personal goods
H. Hotels and restaurants 0.02 144
I. Transport, storage and communication 0.03 170
J. Finantial Intermediation 0.19 86
K. Real estate, renting and business activities 0.12 156
Notes: Proportion of high educated is the average proportion of high educated workers in domestic firms 
and coefficient of variation is the mean divided by the standard deviation times 100.  
Table A3 : 
Proportion of 
Heterogeneity in the Workforce Composition of Domestic Firms Low Medium High
D. Manufacturing
 DA. Food products, beverages and tabacco -0.147 0.112 0.035
[0.012]*** [0.010]*** [0.005]***
 DB. Textiles and textile products  -0.037 0.029 0.008
[0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.003]***
 DC. Leather and leather products -0.021 0.027 -0.006
[0.011]** [0.010]*** [0.003]*
 DD. Wood and wood products -0.034 0.026 0.008
[0.018]* [0.015]* [0.006]
 DE. Pulp, paper and paper products -0.061 0.056 0.005
[0.032]* [0.025]** [0.014]
 DG. Chemicals and chemical products  -0.16 0.1 0.06
[0.017]*** [0.014]*** [0.007]***
 DH. Rubber and plastic products -0.089 0.063 0.026
[0.023]*** [0.020]*** [0.011]**
 DI. Other non-metallic mineral products -0.181 0.143 0.037
[0.012]*** [0.010]*** [0.006]***
 DJ. Basic metals and fabricated metal products 0.017 -0.016 -0.001
[0.017] [0.014] [0.007]
 DK. Machinary and equipment n.e.c. 0.002 -0.019 0.017
[0.020] [0.018] [0.007]**
 DL. Electrical and optical equipment -0.018 0.004 0.014
[0.024] [0.020] [0.010]
 DM. Transport equipment -0.147 0.105 0.042
[0.018]*** [0.016]*** [0.005]***
 DN. Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c -0.045 0.019 0.026
[0.017]*** [0.015] [0.007]***
F. Construction -0.108 0.063 0.046
[0.018]*** [0.015]*** [0.008]***
G. Wholesale and retail trade -0.281 0.152 0.129
Repair motor vehicles and personal goods [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.004]***
H. Hotels and restaurants -0.074 0.058 0.017
[0.017]*** [0.015]*** [0.005]***
I. Transport, storage and communication -0.403 0.329 0.074
[0.026]*** [0.023]*** [0.006]***
J. Finantial Intermediation -0.013 -0.017 0.03
[0.013] [0.021] [0.020]
K. Real estate, renting and business activities -0.256 0.06 0.196
[0.029]*** [0.022]*** [0.018]***
Table A4: Differences in Workforce Composition
Between Foreign and Domestic Firms, by Sector of Activity
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are corrected for 
clustering at the firm level. Controls for the sector, region, year, size and age of the firm included but not reported.  Manufacturing Non-Manufacturing
4 years before 4.4 -37.6
[20.9] [74.7]
3 years before 18.2 -35.2
[16.4] [56.6]
2 years before -3.3 -17.9
[13.5] [42.4]
1 year before -4.2 -16.1
[12.6] [31.5]
1 year after -1.7 35.0
[12.5] [24.7]
2 years after -11.9 69.1
[13.5] [26.0]***
3 years after -14.6 75.8
[15.4] [27.6]***
4 years after -22.5 -
[17.9]
Adj-R square 0.93 0.99
Observations 437 302
Table A5:  Employment Evolution in Acquired Firms 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%. Firm effects included; Year of the acquisition is the omited category. Average size of the
firm is 223 employees in manufacturing and 273 in non-manufacturing. Low Medium High
D. Manufacturing
 DA. Food products, beverages and tabacco 0.188 0.241 0.235
[0.050]*** [0.038]*** [0.055]***
 DB. Textiles and textile products  0.14 0.128 0.307
[0.039]*** [0.046]*** [0.060]***
 DC. Leather and leather products 0.045 0.108 0.264
[0.021]** [0.048]** [0.122]**
 DD. Wood and wood products 0.015 -0.057 0.145
[0.044] [0.054] [0.123]
 DE. Pulp, paper and paper products 0.122 0.055 0.123
[0.050]** [0.088] [0.153]
 DG. Chemicals and chemical products  0.154 0.178 0.122
[0.054]*** [0.044]*** [0.043]***
 DH. Rubber and plastic products 0.026 0.053 -0.04
[0.056] [0.072] [0.114]
 DI. Other non-metallic mineral products 0.216 0.13 0.272
[0.041]*** [0.030]*** [0.071]***
 DJ. Basic metals and fabricated metal products 0.035 0.093 0.149
[0.032] [0.046]** [0.068]**
 DK. Machinary and equipment n.e.c. 0.096 0.13 0.233
[0.046]** [0.075]* [0.109]**
 DL. Electrical and optical equipment 0.002 0.09 0.308
[0.061] [0.057] [0.145]**
 DM. Transport equipment 0.216 0.077 0.263
[0.038]*** [0.052] [0.065]***
 DN. Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c -0.018 0.008 0.147
[0.060] [0.065] [0.173]
F. Construction 0.173 0.219 0.383
[0.078]** [0.093]** [0.129]***
G. Wholesale and retail trade 0.192 0.303 0.277
Repair motor vehicles and personal goods [0.050]*** [0.039]*** [0.049]***
H. Hotels and restaurants 0.012 0.13 0.206
[0.041] [0.037]*** [0.067]***
I. Transport, storage and communication 0.103 0.145 0.195
[0.065] [0.060]** [0.069]***
J. Finantial Intermediation 0.142 0.091 0.059
[0.046]*** [0.038]** [0.064]
K. Real estate, renting and business activities 0.025 0.088 0.129
[0.017] [0.046]* [0.058]**
Table A6: Differences in Wages Between Foreign and Domestic Firms, by Sector of Activity
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Controls for three digit sector, 
region, size, cohort of the firm, age (age squared) of workers, potential experience of workers (potential experience squared), tenure on 
the firm (tenure squared) and the proportion of females in the educational group included in the model but coefficients not reported. 
Regressions are weighted by the number of employees in each group. 